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ABSTRACT 
 
 
High profile mega-events such as the Olympics and Pan-Am Games are often the 
topic of much public attention and discussion due to their mix of sport, politics, and 
commerce. However, such mega-events are subject to large costs, controversies, and 
complex challenges that outweigh their benefits and often reinforce dominant social 
groups in society. In an attempt to justify the large expenditures of hosting an event, 
legacy projects that incorporate some form of social benefit are promised during the 
bidding phase. This paper presents a case study of Toronto’s mega event experience 
of hosting the 2015 Pan Am Games and the incorporation of affordable housing into 
the Athletes Village development in the West Don Lands. The research tells a 
familiar story of missed opportunity to fulfill the promised affordable housing 
targets proposed during the bidding phase. Although the public has had a largely 
important and effective role in developing the planning framework for the West Don 
Lands Precinct and Athletes Village, the decision to reduce the final number of 
affordable housing units ultimately lacked public input. This paper intends to 
generate discourse on mega events as a neoliberal tool for growth by focusing on 
the missed opportunities to create much needed affordable housing. This paper 
explores the theories, relationships, and outcomes of Toronto’s experience as a 
means to inform future decision-making on housing provisions.   
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FOREWORD 
 
This Major Paper is the final document to satisfy the requirements of my Plan of 
Study in the Master of Environmental Studies Planning Program in the Faculty of 
Environmental Studies, York University. This paper is a case study on Toronto’s 
mega event experience hosting the 2015 Pan Am Games which draws on the three 
components of my Plan of Study: 1) Urban Planning and Economic Restructuring, 2) 
Political Economy of Exclusion, and 3) Mega Events.  
 
Component #1 ‘Urban Planning and Economic Restructuring’ focuses on the 
transitions of urban form over time and how they are shaped by the relationships 
between land use and global patterns of development. Through my case study of the 
Athletes Village development in the West Don Lands I contribute to the learning 
objectives for Component #1 of my Plan of Study: to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of planning theories and practices, to comprehend the current 
planning discourses and literature in order to understand the reshaping of urban 
form, and to gain a basic understanding of regional planning in order to understand 
key issues of sustainability, transportation, and economic development.  
 
Component #2 ‘Political Economy of Exclusion’ is concerned with the role that 
economic structures play in decision-making processes at a local level through the 
influence of growth coalitions. My paper fulfills the learning objectives for 
component #2 of my Plan of Study: first to gain a fundamental understanding of 
theories in political economy, to become familiar with planning policy in order to 
reflect on more equitable ways to plan, and third to obtain a critical understanding 
of the causal forces that have produced social exclusion.  
 
Component #3 ‘Mega Events’ relates to the use of landmark events such as the 
Olympics or Pan Am Games as a significant way to enforce dominate social patterns. 
This paper completes the requirements that fulfill the learning objectives for 
component #3 of my Plan of Study: to gain knowledge on mega events and their 
impact on urban and regional environments, and to gain working knowledge of the 
socio-economic and political relations between mega events and urban 
environments.  
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Introduction  
International mega-events capture global attention and offer a platform to 
push forward growth-driven agendas that are made available through the hosting. 
These events are often seen as a window of opportunity to invest in infrastructure 
required for city building or redevelopment initiatives. In recent years, there have 
been increasing interests for mega-event related housing legacies. While some argue 
that mega-events can trigger the revitalization of derelict neighborhoods (Silvestre, 
2009), others argue that mega-events have a more negative impact on housing and 
housing rights for marginalized groups (Silvestre, 2009). The huge public costs 
related to competition venues, infrastructure, housing, or the environmental 
cleanup of vast wastelands typically accompany the rights to host such an event and 
can increase the price of hosting well over a billion dollars. The large expense is 
often justified with some sort of promised public benefits such as affordable 
housing, however, in many cases the initial promises rarely materialize in the host 
cities.  
This research examines the impacts of a particular mega-event on housing 
using the development of the 2015 Pan Am Athletes Village in the West Don Lands 
in Toronto as a case-study. When the City of Toronto was first awarded the rights to 
host the Pan Am Games in 2009, the initial proposal included the construction of 
1,700 market-housing units and 400 affordable rental homes (Lysyk, 2016). 
However, the final housing numbers were reduced to 810 market-housing units and 
253 affordable rental homes (Lysyk, 2016). This study investigates this reduction in 
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total units with the hopes that the experience of the Games sheds light on the 
pressing need to address systemic change for increased provisions towards 
affordable housing.  
This paper focuses on the following question:  How has the 2015 Pan-Am 
games experience influenced urban development policies towards improved 
affordable housing?  In order to respond to this question, I specifically ask: How did 
affordable housing policies come to be incorporated into the development of the 
2015 Pan-Am Games Athletes Village?  In what ways do the urban processes 
associated with sport mega- events influence the policy-making of host cities? 
This paper is divided into four sections. It begins by defining mega-events in 
contemporary literature, followed by the impacts that these events have on housing 
and the role of international sport organizations. The paper then profiles the 2015 
Pan Am experience and the final sections examining the housing outcomes of the 
Athletes Village.   
1. Defining Mega-Events  
The actual phenomenon of mega-event can be dissected through a diverse 
range of disciplinary approaches connected through a vast amount of theoretical 
lenses. In academic literature, mega-events are often associated with events such as 
the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) Summer Olympic Games and the 
Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)’s World Cup. The term 
mega-event is also used to describe smaller scale events of size such as Toronto’s 
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2015 Pan American Games, events with colonial roots such as the Commonwealth 
Games, and other non-sporting events like the World Expo. While mega-event 
discourse tends to agree on what qualifies as mega-events, there is less agreement 
with what a mega-event actual is. Mega-events are largely considered a one time, 
unique, high profile event (Hiller, 2000) that can put the host city on centre stage to 
a regional or global audience for a few short weeks while bearing long term 
consequences (Roche, 1994).  
For this paper, mega-events can be understood as a rare moment of socio-
spatial interaction where customary political practices are neglected, altered, or 
temporarily abandoned (Pentifallo, 2015). Since mega-events are seldom to return 
to a host city twice, the political, social, and economic processes that go into the 
preparation of such events are noticeably enhanced. Thus, seeking out large-scale 
events has become part of a deliberate policy strategy for promoting local economic 
growth and offers an unequivocal opportunity to combine development, desires, 
and change.  
Urban Politics of Mega Events  
While contemporary literature has debated as to what constitutes as a mega-
event, the nature of urban politics also bears great importance towards 
understanding how such events function and interact with government processes 
and policy making (Pentifallo, 2015).  Several key contributors have given insight on 
the forces of urban transformation and have applied their arguments to the study of 
sports mega-event. Harvey (1987) speaks to the shifts away from traditional Fordist 
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modes of production and accumulation to a regime of flexible accumulation where 
cities attempting to pursue compensatory measures seek competitive advantage 
through the development of new urban strategies different than the status quo. This 
shift in economic restructuring has pushed cities to pursue innovative measures to 
replace lost industrial capacity (Harvey, 1987). Yet, deeply imbedded within this 
transition is the manifestation of vastly uneven patterns of urbanization, leading to 
drastic polarization within social and spatial urban classes (Harvey, 1987).  
Harvey (1989) describes this transition as “new entrepreneurialism”, where 
the erosion of many cities economic and fiscal bases coupled with the loss of federal 
funds discouraged old-style managerial approaches in local governance and 
promoted a more entrepreneurial strategy. According to Harvey (1989), the 
entrepreneurial city has three main characteristics: (1) public-private partnerships; 
(2) a shift away from rationally and coordinated development efforts; and (3) a 
particular focus on the political economy of place rather than territory or space. 
Such conceptions drive force behind strategies of speculative construction projects 
to raise the competitive profile of cities and prospect of economic consumption 
(Pentifallo, 2015). It is the competitive aspect of the entrepreneurial city that 
provides the ideological justification for “place-competitive re-imaging strategies” 
like sport mega-events (Harvey, 1989: 15). A great deal of literature attempts to 
consider the connection of mega-events as a mechanism for attracting mobile 
capital and people under the pressure of increased inter-urban competition 
(Pentifallo, 2015). Research argues that there is indeed a great correlation between 
mega-events and any strategy of economic regeneration, largely due to the sector’s 
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ability to generate employment, tourism, investment opportunities, and to 
redevelop underutilized lands (Hall, 1992). This argument is led by the ability of 
business to shift capital in order to take advantage of investment opportunities 
(Hall, 1992). It is not surprising then that strong links are often forged between 
transnational capital and mega-events that allows for the creation of local and 
transnational partnerships to develop. Hiller (2003) finds that the ability for mega-
events to centralize and expedite planning practices, to increase involvement of 
private sector participation, and to loosen bureaucratic red tape has been 
successfully inserted into elements of entrepreneurial urban governance.  
As a new form of urban governance, entrepreneurialism seeks to unite the 
powers of the state, civil society and private interests through inducing the 
formation of coalitions for the purposes of larger urban agendas (Pentifallo, 2015; 
Harvey, 2012). These groups, fall under the moniker of growth machines and 
coalitions (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Molotch, 1976) or urban regimes (Stone, 
1989) are groups of actors working towards vested economic and political interests 
(Pentifallo, 2015). The notion of the city as a growth machine presents the argument 
that cities perceived as a “place” creates a market commodity capable of generating 
wealth and power for networks of diverse agents operating towards the allure of 
financial possibilities. As Logan and Molotch (1987: 50) write, “the city is a growth 
machine, one that can increase aggregate rents and trap related wealth for those in 
the right position to benefit.” Moreover, Molotch (1976: 310) identifies that growth 
as a theoretical basis acts as “the key operative motivation toward consensus for 
members of politically mobilized local elites, however split they might be on other 
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issues.” In arguing that the “very essence of a locality is its operation as a growth 
machine,” economic growth takes precedent in the city and acts as the uniting force 
amongst political and urban elites (Molotch, 1976: 10, see also Pentifallo, 2015). 
This growth machine ideology is identified by Burbank et al. (2001) as a key 
instrument in part of a wider strategy for promoting economic growth. These 
pursuits are regarded in shaping both local patterns of growth and urban 
development in which mega-events become an integral part of urban re-imaging 
and place competitiveness strategies. Such competitive motivations is typically 
instrumental to gaining public acceptance for mega-event bids and legitimate 
rationale for the allocation of resources to fund projects and pursuing economic 
growth activities (Burbank et al., 2001) The allure of growth often results in 
expediting financing and developments for projects that would have ultimately 
taken much longer to come to fruition if not at all (Law, 1993).  This enduring 
quality alone makes it very difficult for opposition or policy initiatives to challenge 
or even question decisions due to the popular and powerful symbolism of a mega-
event.  
Boosters of mega-events, i.e., the social and political elites, generally 
rationalize the hosting of mega-events with claims of global exposure, increased 
tourism and economic growth. However, too often many unforeseen contingencies 
such as cost overruns or false budget projections are not only silenced but also 
reduce prospects for economic growth. Despite evidence of limited economic 
benefits, the number of bidding cities has gradually increased. The symbolic appeal 
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of mega-events is so great that cities often bid for the hosting rights with full 
knowledge that the bid will be unsuccessful (Gold and Gold, 2010). These spectacles 
are now largely seen as legitimate survival tools for cities engaged in the fierce 
global market. Boosters, lobbyists, and political officials are usually adamant on the 
image changing characteristics that mega-events can bring and too often mega-
events are pursued as an instrument through which the urban landscape can be 
transformed.  
Neoliberalism and Mega-Events  
Global inter-urban competition is not a new phenomenon as cities in colonial 
power centers fought for the control of resources, trade networks, and territorial 
rule. In the contemporary era, rapid globalization has required cities around the 
globe to compete to attract finance, corporate headquarters, and components of the 
central command functions of the global economy (Sassen, 2000). However, another 
systemic change has been even more influential in altering international order. 
Neoliberalism and its set of principles have effectively evolved into a dominating 
force for directing economic and political decision-making.  Neoliberalism uses 
principles of 18th century liberalism as its ideal vehicle for the market to expand its 
functions (Smith, 2002), expanding on the notion of free, democratic, and individual 
self-interest, ultimately rendering a free market as an ideal environment for such 
virtues to exist. As Brenner and Theodore (2002: 2) explain, “the linchpin of 
neoliberal ideology is the belief that open, competitive, and unregulated markets, 
liberated from all forms of state interference, represent the optimal mechanism for 
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economic development”. This belief has allowed neoliberalism to be the ideological 
foundation for competitive international economics, feeding into rhetoric and policy 
decisions for competitiveness and rapid growth. Under this system, the role of the 
state is to re-orient and create an environment that encourages capital 
accumulation (Harvey, 2005). Within this economic model, private interests have 
risen to a position of control that reinforces governments to facilitate open and 
competitive markets in order for the fruits of capitalist endeavor to trickle down for 
the whole system to enjoy (Harvey, 2011).  
Neoliberalism operates through institutional structures, policy regimes, and 
regulatory practices that interact with pre-existing uses of space in search for ways 
to increase the accumulation of capital. The concept has been referred to as creative 
destruction, relating to “geographically uneven, socially regressive, and politically 
volatile trajectories of institutional and spatial change” (Brenner and Theodore, 
2002: 2). This notion of creative destruction indicates two simultaneous processes 
that coexist within neoliberalism and particularly useful when applied to the mega-
event host city. Similar tendencies occur in mega-event host cities that reflect 
creative destruction discourse, referring to the breakdown of existing governmental 
institutional arrangements alongside the development of new infrastructure to 
promote commodification and capital-centric rhetoric (Pentifallo, 2015).  Eick 
(2010) goes further to highlight the conflicting tendencies by assessing FIFA and 
similar organizations such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and argues 
that the mega-event itself encourages new pro-capital institutions and practices to 
dismantle existing structures of governance to allow structures of neoliberalism to 
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be produce even further.  As the host city provides the necessary infrastructure 
required, the mega-event allows international organizations such as FIFA and the 
IOC to maximize profit through the vehicle of commercialization of the existing and 
created urban space (Eick, 2010). 
The city serves as the playground for neoliberal policy experiments, and by 
extension the mega-event city is an experiment in which agents of global capital are 
able to manipulate urban space and social relations. This extension ranges from 
policies that focus on place-making and boosterism to social control, policing, and 
surveillance, all of which are direct outcomes to hosting the mega-event (Brenner 
and Theodore, 2002; Pentifallo, 2015).  Under neoliberal governance, there is a 
tendency to engage in models that provide large-scale urban redevelopment 
schemes. Mega-events provide an opportunity to start a development project that 
has long been planned, or initiate a policy that would never have been possible 
without the mega-event label swaying approval. However, influencing land 
development through the mega-event vehicle can bring with them prospects of 
gentrification or displacement or associated rhetoric of revanchist policies in the 
form of outlawing panhandling, criminalizing poverty or limiting the right to 
freedom of speech in order control those outspoken individuals against the mega-
event (MacLeod and Ward, 2002). Evidence shows mega-event organizers using 
policies as a form of social control in an attempt to decide who has access to certain 
public spaces, either in the form of urban clearance or induced marginalization of 
undesirable population. Thus, it is interesting to dig further as to why many mega-
event host cities incorporate affordable housing within the mega-event 
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development plans and even more enticing to think about the impact such decisions 
can have in projecting an image of the host city.  
2. Mega-Events and Impacts on Housing 
Mega-events often come with a housing envelope that might initially serves the sole 
purpose of the event per se but that is packaged as a key legacy of such event in a 
climate of social housing shortage. In order to understand the housing relationship 
of mega-events it is first important to review the international legal framework that 
applies to the housing impacts and more importantly, to mega-events. A study 
conducted by the Geneva-based Centre On Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) 
raises serious concerns relating to housing rights under international human rights 
law and the housing impacts associated with mega-events. National regulations 
differ in their ability to protect housing rights. Using international rules rather than 
national law provides a universal standard of reference that can harmonize national 
regulations. Human rights law is the only existing internationally agreed expression 
of minimum conditions that everyone should enjoy in order to live with dignity as 
human beings (COHRE, 2007). Such rights can provide guidance to stakeholders 
involved in the planning and hosting of mega-events on how to mitigate housing 
impacts, regardless of the host city or local culture.  
Adequate housing as a right 
Adequate housing is cemented into several international human rights 
legislations and is regarded as essential criteria to the well-being and dignity of any 
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individual. Housing rights have been essential components of the highest regarded 
international legislations, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR, 1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR, 1966), and elaborated by the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (UNCESCR, 1991), which is responsible for monitoring governments 
compliance with the ICESCR and provides clarity of policy through general 
comments. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights’s General Comment No.4, 
initially adopted in 1991, focuses on the right to adequate housing. The comment 
interprets the right to affordable housing as “the right to live somewhere in security, 
peace, and dignity” (UNCESCR, 1991). This interpretation refers to something more 
then just a physical structure. This General Comment reaffirms that adequate 
housing means adequate privacy, protection against forced evictions, harassment 
and other threats, while also being provided basic infrastructure and close distances 
to job opportunities and social services, at an affordable cost. Paragraph 8 of the 
General Comment lays out the seven dimensions of adequacy to be taken into 
account when assessing efforts towards housing rights. They are: 
1. Legal security of tenure; 
2. Availability of services, material, facilities and infrastructure; 
3. Affordability; 
4. Habitability; 
5. Accessibility; 
6. Location; and 
7. Cultural Adequacy.  
 
Further to these seven dimensions, particular attention must be paid to 
vulnerable and marginalized groups which are susceptible to violations of their 
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rights such as women, children, minoritized groups, and people with disabilities 
(COHRE, 2007).  All of these elements should be taken into context when preparing 
to host a mega-event, in particular when it comes to the treatment of minoritized 
and vulnerable groups.  
Obligations to Housing Rights  
Ultimately, the primary responsibility for the protection and promotion of 
human rights rests upon the government in charge. Under international human 
rights law, national governments have an obligation to protect housing rights of 
their population. This means that governments must ensure that the proper 
measures of set in place should landlords, developers, or corporations violate any 
housing rights, in order to mitigate and prevent further damage.  
However, in regards to major sporting events, there are increasing expectations 
from the international community that other actors, such as international sports 
organizations behind the events/games and affiliated sponsors should respect 
international human rights norms and standards (COHRE, 2007). The increased 
power that these organizations have a serious impact on the population’s housing 
rights and many non-state actors themselves have acknowledged that their 
increased power calls for increased responsibilities including respect for universal 
values, international human rights, and environmental standards. The corporate 
sponsors of mega-events, as well as the organizing associations such as the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC), Federation Internationale de Football 
(FIFA), and Pan American Sports Organization (PASO), are no exception to this 
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trend. As entities associated with the construction and development of urban 
infrastructure in preparation of a mega-event, they are expected to uphold human 
rights responsibilities and must act to respect and protect housing rights.  
The housing impacts from mega-events vary in many different forms. They can 
be direct or indirect, short-term or long-term, small scale or large scale. In most 
cases they affect the most vulnerable and marginalized sectors or society, often 
increasing “precariousness, vulnerability, and impoverishment” (COHRE, 2007, 
p.38).  The COHRE (2007) report highlights the most common dimensions of 
housing impacts from mega-events (in no particular order): 
 Displacement and forced evictions in order to pave way for mega-event 
related infrastructure development; 
 Displacement and forced evictions related to redevelopment and 
gentrification that are brought on by mega-events; 
 Displacement and forced evictions related to increases in housing costs due 
to the hosting of mega-events; 
 Increase in housing costs, reducing access to affordable housing; 
 Reduction in social and low-cost housing in the pre and post phases of the 
mega-event; 
 ‘Cleaning operations’ to remove homeless people from sight during the 
mega-event; 
 Increase in ‘special’ legislative policies to facilitate the development of the 
mega-event: for example, expropriating private property, increased police 
powers, restrictions in freedom; 
 Limited transparency and participation over decisions-making affecting 
housing between the residents and public officials. 
 
Many cultural, sporting, and political mega-events have been characterized by 
these negative impacts. The number of people displaced or forcibly evicted from 
event sites ranges in the thousands.  At least 300,000 people were evicted in New 
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Delhi for the 2010 Commonwealth Games, 18,000 people were evicted and 400,000 
people relocated in Shanghai for the 2010 World Expo, and the recent 2014 FIFA 
World Cup in Brazil resulted into 250,000 forced evictions (De Paula, 2014). The 
numbers are staggering and expose serious ethical questions about mega-events 
and the benefits that they are intended to provide to host cities. These negative 
impacts are more than just an unfortunate side-effect of hosting a mega-event, they 
are violations of international human rights law, ranging from the right to adequate 
housing, to rights to participation and information (COHRE, 2007). Preventing these 
violations from occurring rests on all entities involved in the organization of the 
mega-event, including governments, host cities, event organizers, and corporate 
sponsors.  
Increasing Responsibilities Towards Housing Provisions 
International sports governing bodies, such as the IOC and FIFA have failed 
to hold any accountability or any host city accountable for human rights violations 
during one of their mega-events. These governing bodies set out the terms and rules 
that all public actors must follow in the staging of the mega-event, highlighting 
ideals of integrity and sustainability embedded within their internal bidding 
processes. However, when it comes to ensuring respect for human rights are 
maintained in practice, these organizations are lacking. As some of the most 
prominent mega-event organizing bodies in the world, the IOC and FIFA should lead 
in the implementation of policies that other mega-events can be modeled after. 
Instead both organizations have been criticized for their lack of transparency to 
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ensure protection of housing rights. The billions of dollars earned by the 
international sporting organizations through their trademark mega-events limits 
any urgency to change course, and with popularity for their events appearing to be 
higher than ever (support for the 2020 Summer Olympics Bid between Tokyo, 
Istanbul, and Madrid were respectively at 92 percent, 83 percent, and 91 percent), 
advocates for more housing provisions may not be heard.  
While these sport governing bodies have failed to hold any accountability or 
impose severe sanctions for violations, there have been promising new changes to 
its bidding process.  Largely as a direct result of negative international attention, for 
example, bid proposals for the IOC under the 2020 Candidature Procedure and 
Questionnaire require prospective host cities to submit an environmental impact 
assessment and to explain how their proposals and legacy plans can contribute to 
sporting and social development (COHRE, 2007). Additionally, the IOC has 
established an Olympic Games Knowledge Management Program and an Olympic 
Games Impact Study to measure and acknowledge potential effects of the games on 
the host city, region, and country, their environment and citizens. If taken seriously, 
these programs provide an additional platform to transfer knowledge and best 
practices for future host cities that hopefully foster positive practices regarding 
housing rights.  
FIFA follows a similar platform in regards to environmental impact studies 
but like the IOC, the organization has not yet established any formal procedures to 
address violations of the right to housing. However, the positive development 
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towards acknowledging and studying potential damaging effects to the public of 
hosting nations brings optimism for procedures that emphasis on housing rights for 
low-income and marginalized communities.  
As previously stated, beyond international human rights law, there are no 
specific regulations, guidelines, or procedures binding on host cities to prevent 
forced evictions, to protect against the rising cost of housing, to ensure no reduction 
in social housing stock, or to engage with affected residents. For example, the IOC 
has no mechanisms or procedures in place to prevent or mitigate negative impacts 
for host cities (COHRE, 2007). Instead, what has occurred is a greater focus on 
legacy and using mega-events as a way to promise some sort of public benefit. This 
strategy has prompted organizational bodies such as the IOC, FIFA, and PASO to 
incorporate demands for social commitments into the bidding process that speak to 
greater contributions that the event will make to the region’s wider economic, social 
and environmental legacy (PWC, 2012). However, once a bid proposal is chosen 
there are rarely any requisite structures in place to ensure that such commitments 
are followed through.  
Housing Experiences of Past Mega-Events Host Cities 
The discussion that follows describes the experiences of host cities that 
demonstrate the clear and subtle impacts on housing from the staging of a mega-
event. The negative impacts felt by these host cities have largely affected the poorest 
residents of urban areas and questions the social distribution of newly created 
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housing for mega-events. In many mega-event experiences, key decisions were 
made that influenced how post-event housing would be delivered.  
During the bidding process of the Barcelona Olympics of 1992, political 
leaders and mega-event organizers routinely used the promise of subsidized 
housing to gain support to host the games. When Barcelona eventually won the bid 
to host the Olympics, the vision of a housing legacy of affordable housing slowly 
dissipated as the games drew nearer. Eventually only 76 of the 6,000 units built for 
the games were reserved for subsidized housing (Lenskyj, 2008). In addition, the 
neighboring areas experienced increases in land prices which eventually led to the 
displacement of existing residents. Lenskyj (2008) notes that between 1986 and 
1992 housing prices in Barcelona increased by 250 percent and similar increases in 
rents. Although the Olympics in Barcelona were extremely successful from a 
financial standpoint as reports suggest that the games generated US$16.6 billion in 
the Spanish economy (McKay and Plum, 2001), the individuals that benefited the 
most from the games impact on housing were the upper and middle class who saw 
their housing value increased.  
Similarly the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City experienced many 
broken promises in regard to the affordable housing that was intended to be 
delivered through the games.  Housing targets were reduced from 360 to 156 
affordable housing units in the period leading up to the games (Lenskyj, 2008). In 
addition, the post-game housing legacies have been tied to forced evictions, rent 
increases, a rapid increases in gentrification of surrounding areas that have 
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threatened to undo years of grassroot community work for homeless and low 
income citizens.  
Closer to home, the 2010 Vancouver’s Olympic experience is similar to other 
host cities in regard to leveraging the games for a larger growth mandate. The 
Olympics were seen as an opportunity to develop the ‘vacant’ strip of land called 
South East False Creek (SEFC) (the same way that the World Expo 1986 previously 
redeveloped the north shore of False Creek) by building the athletes’ village on the 
site. The City of Vancouver contracted Millenium Development Company to 
complete the construction of the village housing project. Millenium was intended to 
design, finance, and build over 800 market housing units, an additional 252 city-
owned units of social housing, a community centre, and a childcare facility (Scherer, 
2011).  However, after the 2008 economic crash, Millenium was refused further 
funding to complete the rest of the athletes’ village and had their loan agreement 
broken with New-York based hedge fund Fortress Investment Group (Scherer, 
2011). This unforeseen situation led to the City of Vancouver having to advance 
CAD$100 million public money to cover the company’s cost overruns (Scherer, 
2011). In an attempt to reduce cost expenses, the number of affordable units 
decreased from 252 units to 126, with the remaining 126 units being sold for 
market rent. It was initially believed that the high price tag associated with the 
market housing in the village would help indirectly subsidize the affordable housing 
units (CBC, 2010). However, this plan did not play out the way it was intended. 
Vancouver experienced difficulty selling the remaining units and looked poised to 
lose over CAD$230 million, eventually selling the remaining units to Aquilini Group 
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for $91 million (Lee, 2014). Reports have also surfaced about the discomfort 
experienced by social housing tenants living in the Olympic Village. Media reports 
have noted that low-income tenants were forced out due to the high costs of 
utilities. Moreover, they were actively discouraged by the condominium corporation 
from forming a tenants association to better advocate for themselves with the city 
(Vulliamy, 2013).  
Although these experiences range in time period and place, they tell a similar 
story where social benefits of affordable housing are used as a key safeguard in two 
different ways. Firstly, by attaching social benefits to the legacies of the games, they 
can gain acceptance and momentum for the bid from many members of society. 
Secondly, by attaching social benefits of affordable housing, the host city has the 
opportunity to reduce the total unit numbers, often justified as an action to limit 
cost overruns.  Therefore, without any mechanisms in place to ensure that bid 
promises follow through, it is extremely easy and indeed beneficial for actors 
leading the preparation of the games to reduce affordable housing promises.  
Mega-Events Funding Social Housing 
Access to adequate and affordable housing is an essential component to 
thriving and equitable communities. In Toronto, it has been a challenge to handle 
the affordable housing shortages that has crippled so many marginalized 
individuals. In the well documented Three Cities study, Hulchanski (2006) makes it 
clear that Toronto is becoming increasingly polarized between different income 
levels and essentially is losing its middle class while increasing its lower and higher 
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classes. This trend, along with increasing austerity measures for social housing and 
lack of political will has painted a dire situation for the future of affordable housing 
in Toronto.  
Affordable housing at a minimum measure serves a critical economic 
function by supporting productive workforces in large urban centres where 
concentrations of poverty, income polarization, and homelessness are ever present 
(Cote and Tam, 2013). In Ontario, the vast majority of housing is privately owned. Of 
the 4.5 million Ontario households, roughly 70 percent is privately owned and 30 
percent rented with only 5 percent representing affordable housing despite a 
waiting list for affordable units that continues to grow each year (Cote and Tam, 
2013: 1). With the ghastly monthly increases in housing prices, along with increases 
in precarious working and living conditions, many individuals are left with little to 
no stability for their future. Toronto’s situation will only be amplified as the city is 
expected to exceed over 6 million by 2025. This housing predicament calls for a 
rethinking of strategies before the situation is beyond irreversible.   
It is apparent through existing research that hosting a major event naturally 
comes with some opportunities to development of the physical infrastructure (Ali, 
2012). A major event like a Pan Am Games had tremendous potential to investment 
in urban infrastructure and provided an opportunity to align these new investments 
with long-term needs of the city. Hosting of these types of events can also be an 
avenue of funding from higher levels of government to support large-scale 
development projects (Vanwynsberghe et al., 2013)  
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In the case of Toronto, a major sport event presented an opportunity to 
invest in one of the city’s most desperately needed and vital concerns - affordable 
housing. As part of the City’s Housing Opportunities Toronto-An Affordable Housing 
Action Plan 2010-2020, the City has not lived up to its commitment to build 1,000 
units of affordable housing annually between 2010 and 2020. Despite some 
promising results in 2011 and 2012, fewer than 800 units were opened from 2013 
to 2015, while the number of households on the active waiting list for social housing 
since 2010 has increased by 16,966 households (City of Toronto, 2015). In addition, 
while a decade-long housing boom brought considerable economic benefits to the 
Greater Toronto Area, it has exploited structural problems within planning policies.  
A report produced by TD Economics (2015) argues that the strength of the 
housing market has concealed growing challenges that have been lingering under 
the surface, of which include deteriorating affordability, weak diversity of housing 
choice, and a transportation system that is failing to keep up with demand. 
Ultimately, the drastic increase in housing prices has caused 1 in 5 households to 
struggle to find and keep an affordable home (Gaetz et al., 2014). For many Toronto 
residents, the precariousness of housing security and finding affordable housing 
presents significant barriers to improving their quality of life and ultimately have a 
critical negative impact on their ability to participate in society.  Research shows 
that over the past 25 years investment in affordable housing from the federal 
government has decreased by over 46 percent while Canada’s population has 
increased by nearly 30 percent (Gaetz et al., 2014). In fact, federal funding for 
affordable housing continues to decline. In 2012, the City received approximately 
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$161.3 million from Ottawa, by 2017 that will decline to $33.4 million and reach 
zero by 2031 (City of Toronto, 2015). There is therefore a significant shortfall in 
funding required to achieve Toronto’s housing goals and objectives. Thus, when 
Toronto won the rights to host the 2015 Pan Am Games, it represented an 
opportunity to leverage government funds towards the City’s affordable housing 
targets.   
3. Pan Am Games in Toronto 
For three weeks in the summer of 2015, Toronto hosted the Pan Am Games, 
welcoming approximately 10,000 participants and officials from over 42 North, 
Central and Latin American and Caribbean countries across 17 different 
municipalities in the Greater Golden Horseshoe area (Toronto, 2015). The Pan Am 
Games are held every four years. Usually hosted in the summer, these games make 
use of national Olympic committees and represent Olympic values and standards, 
albeit at a smaller scale. The countries that participate in the Pam Am Games must 
be recognized by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), and there are 
currently 42 countries with National Olympic Committees recognized by Pan 
American Sports Organization (PASO), the overseeing body of the Pan Am Games.  
In terms of scale, the Pan Am Games are usually larger than Winter Olympics 
but smaller than Summer Olympic Games . The Pan Am Games in Toronto were 
twice the size of the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics and the largest sporting 
event ever held in Canada. From a comparison, the 2015 Pan Am Games had 31 
venues, 51 events, and 7,666 participants (not including officials), while the 2010 
Vancouver Winter Olympics had 9 venues, 20 events, and 3,072 athletes (not 
23 
 
including officials) (Lysyk, 2016). Although the events were spread out throughout 
the Greater Toronto Area, all 10,000 athletes and officials were housed at the 
Athletes’ Village in the West Don Lands on the Toronto waterfront. The event was 
deemed as a success and was seen as having a lasting and significant legacy in the 
minds of many Torontonians based on its share size alone. Although the full impact 
and lasting legacy of the Games are beyond the scope of the research for this paper, 
analyzing the development process of the Games can inherently aid in future 
complex projects, specifically in providing affordable housing on Toronto’s 
waterfront and potentially influencing affordable housing policies that expand 
beyond the boundaries of the waterfront. 
Pan Am Games and Social Housing 
              As mentioned, social benefits like affordable housing are attached to the 
submissions of bidding cities as a measure to leave behind some sort of lasting 
legacy. Toronto’s quest to host the Pan Am Games was no different. When The West 
Don Lands was identified as the potential site of the Athletes Village by the bidding 
team, they were able to align the progressive affordable housing policies of the 
Central Waterfront Secondary Plan to the games legacy. When the Toronto City 
Council approved the Central Waterfront Secondary Plan in 2003 it represented an 
aggressive bid towards community development objectives for a more equitable 
and inclusive future city. In response to a severe affordable housing crisis and 
homelessness disaster (highlighted by a number of governmental and non-
governmental reports), Paragraph 39 was included in the Central Waterfront 
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Secondary plan to focuses on affordable housing requirements for all residential 
development in the area. This section reads:   
The overall goal for the Central Waterfront is that affordable rental housing 
and low-end of-market housing comprise 25 percent of all housing units... To 
the extent possible, and subject to the availability of funding programs and 
development cross subsidization, the greatest proportion of this housing will 
be affordable rental with at least one quarter in the form of two-bedroom 
units or larger. Senior government funding programs to assist in the delivery 
of affordable rental housing will be aggressively pursued, and appropriate 
opportunities identified to take advantage of such programs (City of Toronto 
2003: Paragraph 39). 
The approval of the policy has proven to be very difficult for those in the 
development community to accept, thus the entire Central Waterfront Secondary 
Plan is subject to ongoing appeals to the Ontario Municipal Board over the last ten 
years (personal communication, City of Toronto, 2015). The objectives of Paragraph 
39 are intended to be produced slowly assigning lands slated for affordable housing. 
Then, as time and money permit, those lands will be developed as either affordable 
rental or ownership. In the case of the West Don Lands, almost 90 percent of the 
lands were publicly owned, which allowed for the construction of the Athletes 
Village to be developed under the policies of the Central Waterfront Secondary Plan 
without lengthy opposition from private owners. Also, it is clear that the high profile 
nature of the Pan Am Games was a key factor to obtain the availability of funds 
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towards affordable housing “because it was the Pan Am Games, the province paid 
for the land and the cost to construct the building… the province has directly 
subsidized the affordable housing” (personal communication, City of Toronto, 
2015). As a City’s representative went on to explain, there is an indirect relationship 
between the Central Waterfront Secondary Plan and the development of the 
Athletes Village. The West Don lands proved to be an ideal location to develop the 
Athletes Village, and while the lands were subject to the affordable housing 
requirements of the Central Waterfront Secondary Plan, it matched the objectives of 
the Pan Am Games in producing some sort of social benefit.   
The West Don Lands and Waterfront Revitalization  
The 80-acre parcel known as the West Don Lands is located to the west of the 
Don River and north of Lake Shore Boulevard and the Gardiner Expressway.  The 
land is provincially owned by Infrastructure Ontario, a provincial landholding 
agency (Bunce, 2011: 289). This site has experienced a mix of uses throughout its 
history. Historically the area formed a large public park in the Old Town of York 
(City of Toronto, 2013) and was gradually re-designated for industrial purposes in 
1813 (West Don Lands Committee, 2000).  When the land was sold in the 1830s to 
finance the construction of a new city hospital, the area transformed into one of 
Toronto’s major industrial hubs (City of Toronto, 2013). The site experienced a mix 
of industrial uses ranging from food packaging operations, a resin storage company, 
a slaughterhouse, to an oil company occupying the site (Toronto Waterfront Joint 
Venture, 2005).  
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By the 1980s, the manufacturing industry began seeking cheaper land and no 
longer relied on the port as an essential component for their operations. Thus, many 
waterfront’s industrial uses began experiencing an economic restructuring that saw 
the retreat of industry, leaving large parcels of highly contaminated lands that were 
often left vacant for decades with limited interests from public and private sectors. 
This was the case for the West Don Lands, after having been used for industrial 
purposes for over a century the site was vacated and despite being used to support 
the underground Canadian film industry (personal communication, 2015), the site 
largely laid derelict for years. In addition, like most of the waterfront, years of heavy 
unregulated industrial uses left the soil highly contaminated and very costly to 
remediate (Lu and Desfor, 2011: 245), which impacted the potential for the site to 
be repurposed. In the same period, planning in the City of Toronto had adopted an 
entrepreneurial stance and a rise of social movements that included antiracism, 
women’s movement, queer politics, and antipoverty. In addition, Toronto 
experienced a reform towards ecological modernization that encompassed urban 
intensification, soil remediation and new urbanist planning. (Desfor et al., 2006).  
From these influences the City of Toronto in partnership with the Province of 
Ontario were interested in redeveloping the site into a residential neighborhood 
similar to St. Lawrence Market Area in an attempt to create social housing and 
remediate the site. The parties involved developed a plan named the Ataratiri Plan 
aimed to create 7,000 new units of public sector’s affordable housing. The Ataratiri 
Plan was adapted from the Toronto Olympic Commitment Plan that was created for 
Toronto’s unsuccessful bid for the 1996 Olympics that proposed the creation of 
27 
 
2,500 units of new housing as part of a larger Olympic Media village (Toronto 
Waterfront Joint Venture, 2005). However, the plan was scrapped after feasibility 
reports revealed the development was unprofitable by a combination of a declining 
real estate market, expensive environmental cleanup and the proximity to the flood 
plain of the Don River that required flood protection cost of $1 billion (City of 
Toronto, 2013). Consequently the site laid vacant once again and resulted in the 
provincial government unsuccessfully attempting to sell the West Don lands to 
private developers (Ali, 2012; West Don Lands Committee, 2000).  
As a strategy for urban renewal, redeveloping the waterfront became a 
primary goal for those who wished to increase Toronto’s competitive image on the 
global playing field (Lehrer and Laidley, 2009). By a combination of encouraging 
major capital investment in the built environment and new political regimes, a case 
for waterfront development began to generate momentum (Lehrer and Laidley, 
2009). In 1989, the federal government appointed The Royal Commission headed by 
former Toronto Mayor David Crombie to provide suggestions on courses of action to 
revitalize the waterfront. Through these efforts, the Waterfront Regeneration Trust 
was created in 1992 to coordinate waterfront development, hosting a variety of 
workshops and consultations that brought together public and private interests 
(Lehrer and Laidley, 2009). The trust focused their attention on the West Don Lands 
and in an attempt to provide a strategic global catalyst to the redevelopment 
(personal communication, 2015) of Toronto’s waterfront, they pursued a bid for the 
2008 Olympic Games under Toronto’s Bid Committee (TOBid). 
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Toronto’s Bid Committee (TOBid) appointed John Bitove Jr. as CEO with the 
task of reigniting Toronto’s hopes for the 2008 Summer Olympics. During this 
period, Bitove’s primary objectives became: (1) ”to win the competition”; (2) to 
secure “tri-government level support to clean up the waterfront”; and (3) to 
“increase the funding for amateur athletes” (Bitove cited in Oliver, 2008: 227). 
Essential to the success of the bid was ensuring that the 2008 Olympic Games could 
be viewed as an opportunity to stimulate waterfront redevelopment. In order to 
facilitate Olympic uses, the City rezoned portions of the waterfront as mixed-use 
areas, opening up former industrial lands (including the West Don Lands) to new 
opportunities (Lehrer and Laidley, 2009). In 1999, drawing from this idea, then-City 
of Toronto Mayor Mel Lastman released a report entitled Our Toronto Waterfront! 
The Wave of the Future, a vision statement for reimaging the city. An integral 
component to the report was the proposed formation of an intergovernmental 
waterfront task force, eventually materializing into the Toronto Waterfront 
Revitalization Task Force in 1999 (Ali, 2012).  Although Toronto lost the 2008 
Olympic bid to Beijing, China, the bid for the games left a rejuvenated interest in 
waterfront redevelopment, transforming Toronto’s competitive strategy from a ‘city 
that works’ to the ‘city that astonishes’ (Lehrer and Laidley, 2009). This interest 
resulted in the Government of Canada, The Province of Ontario and the City of 
Toronto to declare support for the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation 
(TWRC) to assume the responsibility of the waterfront’s renewal (Waterfront 
Toronto, 2016) and endorsing $500 million each towards Toronto’s new waterfront 
vision. The Corporation was subsequently renamed Waterfront Toronto in 2007. 
29 
 
West Don Lands Precinct Plan 
As a tri-governmental organization, Waterfront Toronto is mandated to lead 
the planning and redevelopment process of the City’s central waterfront. Right from 
the onset, one of the first major components of the revitalization plan was focused 
around the redevelopment of the West Don Lands. According to Bunce (2011: 289), 
“Waterfront Toronto’s vision for these lands is the creation of a high-density master 
planned sustainable community with both residential and commercial uses and 
LEED Gold sustainable building design.” Waterfront Toronto introduced the 
precinct-planning concept as a strategy for developing waterfront neighborhoods 
during the formation of the City of Toronto’s Making Waves Plan in the early 2000s 
(Bunce, 2011: 292). Waterfront Toronto’s intent towards using a precinct planning 
process was tied to the sustainability objectives desired for the waterfront, 
specifically reducing the high volumes of vehicular traffic, promoting low impact 
development and impactful mixed use designs. Following a collaborative approach 
between community representations, municipal staff, and other key stakeholders 
the precinct plan was created and the West Don Lands Precinct Plan was adopted by 
City Council in May 2005. The Precinct Plan provided important framework to 
generally determine the built form development, public realm, parks and open 
spaces, sustainability measures, transit, public infrastructure, and phasing and 
implementation initiatives for the area (City of Toronto, 2010).  The West Don Lands 
Block Plans were later approved in 2006 and went one step further to define the 
height and massing of development, setbacks and stepbacks, and the scales and 
character of building facades (City of Toronto, 2010). The Precinct Plan further 
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detailed the broad principles addressed in the Central Waterfront Secondary Plan 
created and approved by the City of Toronto in 2003 (City of Toronto, 2015). The 
Precinct Plan features 6,000 new residences, including 1,200 affordable homes 
based on a target of 20 percent of all new residential units to be affordable rental 
upon completion (City of Toronto, 2013).  
When Toronto’s quest to host the 2008 Olympics fell short once again in 
2001, the City of Toronto prepared a bid to host the 2015 Pan American Games 
resulting in the creation of BIDCO – the Pan Am Games Bid Corporation (Ali, 2012). 
Toronto’s 2015 Pam Am Games bid emphasized the West Don Lands as an ideal 
location for development and more specifically for the Athletes Village. The bid 
detailed all of the work that already went into envisioning and planning the 
proposed site including the LEED buildings, sustainable design, density, walkability, 
home affordability, and diverse community uses (Toronto2015, 2009). The bid 
specifically highlighted that the Athletes Village located on the West Don Lands site 
would act as a trigger to accelerate the remediation and redevelopment of the site 
10 years earlier than expected, and potentially build momentum towards 
redeveloping other facets of the waterfront. Notwithstanding all the challenges that 
would go into remediating the site, part of the rationale behind selecting the West 
Don Lands as the potential Athletes Village was due in part to the previous precinct 
planning work and planning approvals that were well underway for the site 
(Toronto2015, 2009). Waterfront Toronto made very clear the intent in using the 
West Don Lands “for the Pan Am Games Athletes Village means a significant 
increase in the pace of transforming the former industrial lands into a beautiful, 
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sustainable, mix-use neighborhood” (ULI event, 2015). The site also reduced risk of 
meeting tight deadlines by already having a master plan and many development 
applications already in the works. Both BIDCO and Waterfront Toronto promised 
that more than half of the planned community would be developed prior to the start 
of the 2015 Games.   
Toronto won the bid for the 2015 Pan American Games and the West Don 
Lands was constructed on time and on budget for the games, serving the needs of 
10,000 athletes and officials taking part in the event (City of Toronto, 2013). A large 
part of the successful integration of the Athletes Village into the larger vision for the 
West Don Lands area is due to the previous planning work done on the Precinct and 
Block Plans. Having those plans already in place exponentially increased that pace of 
development and made it easier to align the Athletes Village objectives with those 
already established for the area. Although the Precinct Plan strategy adds another 
layer to the municipal planning process, Waterfront Toronto suggests that the plans 
allow for a smoother planning process, provided more certainty for private sector 
development (Bunce, 2011:295). The development appears to be a success for its 
role in servicing the Pan Am Games, however, some financial challenges and 
restructuring of the final development ultimately impacted the proposed housing 
legacies attached to the Games.  
Promised Affordable Housing  
Throughout the whole bidding process it was declared that the games would 
accelerate the revitalization of the West Don lands. These claims are consistent with 
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strategies used by host cities of mega-events to help generate support for staging of 
an event. Hall (1992) argues that mega-events are often exploited and used to 
rejuvenate or develop urban areas through the construction and development of 
new infrastructure, road and rail networks, airports, sewage and housing. This 
strategy was central in Toronto’s mega-event experience, as Waterfront Toronto 
and Infrastructure Ontario suggested that the Games would allow for new sources of 
finance and political support to be attained to fast track redevelopment efforts of 
the waterfront and specifically the West Don lands.  
In addition to these accelerated aspirations for redevelopment, many 
different actors including the West Don Lands Committee and Waterfront Toronto 
believed that the Pan Am Games could act as a catalyst for development of 
affordable housing. George Smitherman, local MPP and Minister of Infrastructure at 
that period, assured the parties involved in the bidding process that winning the 
right to host the Pan Am Games would be a way of achieving a significant level of 
affordable housing (quoted in Ali, 2012). As previously mentioned, bid proposals 
that accommodated some sort of public goods from the hosting of the games not 
only reduced public backlash but also appealed to the unwritten requirements of 
games governing bodies in awarding the games. This meant that generating a 
portion of the redeveloped West Don Lands as affordable housing was not only a 
goal of the West Don Lands committee, who represented -- albeit only to an extent -- 
the communities voice throughout the duration of the bidding process, but also to 
the coalition of actors involved trying to win the bidding rights.  
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  The original predicted timeline for the redevelopment of the West Don Lands 
was originally going to take 10 to 15 years. Early depictions of the Athletes Village 
were revealed in highlighted the layouts that conformed to the West Don Lands 
Precinct Plan. The original plan for the Athletes Village had 2,100 units that would 
be converted into market and affordable housing (Infrastructure Ontario, 2010). 
Particular areas, referred to as Blocks 3, 15, 16, were identified as affordable 
housing, while the remainder of the blocks are reserved for market housing, 
including 100 units of affordable ownership (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1:  West Don Lands Blocks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: City of Toronto, 2010 
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The affordable housing units were designed to cater to different types of household 
needs, including larger bedrooms; 5 percent of the units are 4-bedroom units and 15 
percent are 3-bedroom units. Based on specifications of the West Don Lands 
Precinct Plan, all the buildings were required to achieve LEED Gold and LEED 
Neighbourhood Development (LEED ND) standards (Pella, 2013).   
 
Stakeholders’ Roles and Responsibilities  
The delivery of a project the size of a mega-event Athletes Village normally 
does not fall on the shoulders of a sole agency due to a multitude of financial and 
liability reasons. More importantly, the projects are so large that they usually 
require many responsibilities to be split between different agencies in order to 
deliver the project in time for the games. The development of the Athletes Village 
was no different and often at public events the parties involved reminded the public 
that “it takes a village to build a village” (ULI event, 2015). In order to organize the 
roles and responsibilities between all the different parties involved, a multi-party 
agreement was signed among the Province, the Federal Government, the City of 
Toronto, the Canadian Olympic Committee, the Canadian Paralympic Committee and 
the Ontario 2015 Pan Am Games Bid Corporation upon the announcement of 
Toronto winning the 2015 Games (Ali, 2012). The multi-party agreement provided 
details related to contractual arrangements, financial contributions, legal 
responsibilities, and legacies associated with the games.  
The major agencies involved in the development of the Athletes Village 
included Infrastructure Ontario, Waterfront Toronto and the City of Toronto. 
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Additionally, the Pan Am Organizing Committee (Toronto 2015) was created as the 
successor organization to BIDCO and was responsible for orchestrating the games 
delivery. However, the committee had a minimal role in the development of the 
Athletes Village other than ensuring that the development met the International 
Olympic Committee’s (IOC) technical requirements for Athletes Villages (Jailal, 
2012).  
As the municipality, the City of Toronto regulates development by approving 
applications that conform to planning guidelines within secondary plans, precinct 
plans, and zoning by-laws. The Athletes Village was developed in accordance to the 
City’s approved Precinct and Waterfront Secondary Plans by Waterfront Toronto. 
Prior to the start of the development, the City approved the Draft Plan of 
Subdivision and the site plan for each building in accordance with section 41 of the 
Planning Act (Jailal, 2012). The City also issued building permits, undertook 
inspections, and assumed any road conveyances and public components such as 
Corktown Commons Park. The City’s Waterfront Secretariat played a vital role in 
coordinating the planning and development activities to ensure that the project was 
headed in a timely manner (Ali, 2012).  Additionally, City staff accelerated 
development approvals for all the projects in time to help meet the 2015 deadlines. 
The City of Toronto also worked with the Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing to develop a housing strategy to determine the private operators of the 
affordable housing and how the housing would be sustained over the long term built 
out (Ali, 2012). 
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The development of the site was managed by Infrastructure Ontario, which 
was responsible for procuring and overseeing the construction of the Athletes 
Village. As a public agency, part of Infrastructure Ontario’s mandate is to generate 
revenue by modernizing and maximizing value of public infrastructure to support 
provincial objectives (Infrastructure Ontario, 2016). To minimize the public’s risk 
on the project, Infrastructure Ontario delivered the project through an alternative 
financing and procurement project delivery model. Infrastructure Ontario received 
and reviewed three competitive bids for the project. Infrastructure Ontario’s most 
challenging responsibility was selecting a proponent that would ensure the Village 
would be completed on time and on budget (Ali, 2012).  
The winning bid was announced in September 2011, selecting Dundee 
Kilmer Developments Limited has the successful proponent with a total 
development and construction cost of $871 million (Ali, 2012).  The development 
team was tasked with the full design and construction of the Athletes Village and 
post-games development. Construction began in December 2011 and was mostly 
completed and turned over to TO2015 in January 2015. Athletes and officials used 
the site for the duration of the games in July and August 2015. The site was then 
returned to the development team in September 2015 for conversion to its 
permanent use.  
During the development, Waterfront Toronto provided guidance to 
Infrastructure Ontario in the designing and developing the site. As the key agency 
responsible for waterfront development their role was to ensure that Dundee 
Kilmer Developments Limited was developing the site in accordance to previously 
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approved and award winning Precinct Plans developed by Waterfront Toronto. 
Having Waterfront Toronto involved with the development was another measure to 
help integrate the Athletes Village into the larger vision of the waterfront 
community.  
As a valuable contributor towards the development of the area’s precinct 
plans, the West Don Lands Committee are considered a well-informed and well 
connected group representing the area’s constituents. The West Don Lands 
Committee played a large role providing public input around issues that concerned 
the community and were influential convincing the parties involved to prepare a 
special request for qualification procurement process to select the affordable 
housing operators. Additionally, as a representation of the area’s constituencies, 
their members needed to be satisfied with any development approached taken 
throughout the construction of the village.  
Toronto2015 also acted as a short-term tenant working collaboratively with 
Dundee Kilmer Developments Limited to assist with required technical 
specifications. Dundee Kilmer Developments comprised a larger team that included 
Dundee Realty Corporation, Kilmer Van Nostrand Company Limited, EllisDon 
Construction, Ledcor Design Build (Ontario) Inc., Brookfield Financial Corporation, 
Architects Alliance, Kuwabara Payne Mckenna Blumberg, Daoust LeStage Inc., and 
TEN Arquitectos (Architects Alliance, 2012).  
Table 1 below highlights the roles and responsibilities of each agency 
involved in the delivery on the Athletes Village and offers good indication of how 
these agencies worked together to not only achieve individual agency goals but also 
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the primary goal of project completion.  The lead agency (Infrastructure Ontario) 
and the developer (Dundee Kilmer) have an objective to generate profits or create a 
return on their investment. The objective of economic growth directly challenges 
the objectives of the proposed social benefits for the community, primarily the 
affordable housing that was included in the winning proposal for the Pan-Am 
Games.  The City of Toronto was required to accelerate the time required to review 
development applications in order to ensure that the Athletes Village would be 
completed on time.    
Table 1: Role and Responsibilities of Different Actors  
In Developing the Pan Am Games’ Athletes Village 
 
Source:  Various planning documents and interviews by the author 
Upon reviewing the roles and responsibilities of key actors involved in 
delivering the Athlete’s Village, it becomes easier to think of them in relation to the 
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regime and growth machines theory.  Burbank et al. (2001) use this framework to 
analyze urban politics of mega-events.  They argue that regime theory is about 
building coalitions and emphasizes the local government’s power of social 
production, stating, “fundamentally, an urban regime is a mechanism for 
overcoming obstacles to exercising power at the local level” (Burbank et al., 2001: 
24). The authors explain that without coalitions, no bid for a mega-event would ever 
occur. Toronto’s many attempts to bid for a mega-event is a reflection of numerous 
bodies of coalitions trying to make use of the West Don Lands site. However, these 
coalitions experienced many challenges that ranged from a declining real estate 
market, to high interests rates, to limited public support, and a juxtaposition of 
numerous government agencies that made planning on the waterfront 
dysfunctional. 
What is most compelling about the failed bid attempts is that they were 
successful in generating discussion about the future of the waterfront and 
eventually after the failed bid attempt for the 2008 Olympics the foundations were 
laid for a restructured planning focus through the development of Waterfront 
Toronto. Moreover, once the public agency was created it was able to aligned their 
planning initiatives with that of growth coalitions aiming to secure a mega-event on 
Toronto’s Waterfront. Using Stoker and Mossberger’s (1994) focus on symbolic 
regime may be more appropriate to explain the mega-event case. A symbolic regime 
is growth-oriented, but only under certain conditions; it perceives a need to change 
the city’s image and is a more inclusive, process-driven, and dependent on external 
resources (such as grants) in order to meet goals. For Toronto’s Pan Am Games 
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experience, a major reason why the winning bid by the bid team BIDCO was selected 
was due to the previous planning work for the West Don Lands, which allowed for 
the Athletes Village to fit into the larger vision for the waterfront redevelopment. 
Additionally, other factors generated a lot of support including: the provincial 
ownership (through Infrastructure Ontario) of the site; the already funded and 
approved applications for supporting infrastructure was underway; and the existing 
precinct plans acted as blueprints for development. All of these conditions also tied 
into the idea that if the West Don Lands were developed into the Athletes Village for 
the Pan Am Games, it would act as a catalyst to open investment opportunities to the 
rest of the waterfront, specifically the East Bayfront and the Port Lands. This is 
because redevelopment of the West Don Lands would be the initial measure for 
flood protection and community development for the area. Redevelopment created 
a mutual level of cooperation between all actors, including all levels of government, 
residents, and developers towards similar objectives of growth. Burbank et al. 
(2001: 168) note, “[a] mega-event is sought not because it is appealing in a narrow 
cost-benefit sense, but because the event fits into the larger purpose of an urban 
regime’s desire to promote growth.”  Moreover, regime theory suggests that large 
development projects are guided by dominant groups of business actors whose 
interests align with political decision makers (Ali, 2012; Burbank et al., 2001). 
Applying this thought to the hosting of the Pan Am Games, it is evident that the 
hosting of the Games had a larger intention of not only accelerating the 
redevelopment of the waterfront but also to promote growth through the use as a 
catalyst project. This is why the multi-party agreement was important as it ensured 
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that government-business networks and partnerships were developed to provide 
the authority and resources for redevelopment associated with the Games so that no 
mistakes or delays were to occur. Some ways that this streamlining occurred was 
through committee meetings with all actors ensuring open lines of communication, 
fast tracking of all approvals, allowing for construction to occur on time, and 
through a financing model that sought to leverage the financial responsibility onto 
the developer while also awarding development rights to additional sites.  
Financing and Development Agreement  
An alternative financing and procurement model was used to deliver the 
Games. The financing and procurement model is a frequently used approach for 
public-private partnerships towards the delivery of major projects in Ontario. Under 
these agreements, private-sector businesses deliver large infrastructure projects 
and the various partners allow for a share in the responsibilities and business risk 
(Infrastructure Ontario, 2014).  Although, the detailed analysis of the financial cost 
for delivering the Athletes Village lies beyond the scope of this research, it is still 
important to understand the financing model that was implemented to develop the 
West Don Lands. Under the financing and procurement model, the Province of 
Ontario established the scope and requirements of the project. A private sector 
agency was then selected to finance the construction work. This process was 
pursued as a protective measure to limit the risk for the public sector and instead 
transfers the pressure to the private sector who must complete the project on time 
and on budget (Ali, 2012).  In 2011, Dundee Kilmer Development Limited was 
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selected to take on the development of the West Don Lands and had the 
responsibility to design, build and finance the Athletes Village (Infrastructure 
Ontario, 2011). This project included the construction of the new residential 
community (including the affordable housing units), roads and services, all of which 
needed to maintain the environmentally sustainable criteria laid out in the Precinct 
Plan for the area.  
To develop the site, a fixed-price contract was signed between the Province 
of Ontario and Dundee Kilmer Development Limited in the amount of $514 million 
(Infrastructure Ontario, 2012). The contract was paid out in three installments 
during the development of the site for the Games. In December of 2011, the first 
installment of $21 million was paid to prepare the site for development with new 
roads and services. In April 2013, the second installment of $100 million went to 
completing the facilities including the market and affordable housing projects and 
student residence. Finally, early in 2015 the last installment of $393 million went 
towards completing the last portions of the redevelopment and converting the 
facilities into their permanent post-Games state (Infrastructure Ontario 2012).  
The Village Development consisted of eight blocks, of these only five blocks 
(stage 1) were required for permanent buildings for the games. The remaining lands 
(stage 2) were included in the Request for Proposals process and were transferred 
to Dundee Kilmer Development Limited at a cost of $10 in an attempt to reduce total 
development costs to the province (Lysyk, 2016). The stage 2 lands are estimated to 
be valued at $48.9 million. As part of the development agreement, Dundee Kilmer 
Development Limited is expected to develop these blocks between 2019 and 2021 
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at its own cost, and is entitled to all the revenues from them (Lysyk, 2016).  The 
contract was structured in a way to ultimately benefit Dundee Kilmer Development 
Limited as the development company was given the development rights for market 
housing on additional blocks. This structure allowed the price of the contract to be 
reduced by leveraging the potential sales of the market housing. Adding to that 
benefit, the contract did not include additional affordable housing units to be 
contracted beyond what was needed to be built in time for the Pam Am Games (Ali, 
2012).  Not only did the structure of the contract benefit the developer, but it also 
has potential impact on the future plans of the area. An agency like Waterfront 
Toronto is dependent on recovering funds from the sale of remediated land to 
private developers to assist in their larger planning initiatives (Lysyk, 2016). The 
revenue that was lost through the transfer of the stage 2 lands could have gone back 
into the area for future initiatives instead of being transferred into the pockets of 
the developer.  
The development agreement for the Village also included safeguards that 
intended to provide security to the province. However, upon further analysis these 
safeguards ultimately benefited the developer. To limit the risk to the province, the 
project agreement required the developer to provide letters of credit that the 
government could draw on should the developer fail to fulfill the scope of work. The 
agreement also stated that for every day after the target date, the developer was 
also required to pay $100,000 to the province. These safe guards did provide 
protection to the province and shifted the responsibly to the developer. However, 
the province still made public resources available should the developer require 
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financial assistance, as provincial loans were made available to also reduce the risk 
faced by the developer.  Private lenders generally do not advance construction loans 
to developer until at least 75% of the units have been sold. If Dundee Kilmer 
Development Limited experienced slow sales, then the group may have had to seek 
more costly bridge financing. To avoid this, the province made a $230.7 million loan 
available should the developer have required financial assistance (Lysyk, 2016). The 
structure of the agreement was designed to work within the parameters of a growth 
coalition, which is designed to allow all parties to work towards similar objectives of 
economic growth. The province was able to reduce the risk of the development onto 
the private sector, while the private sector was able to greatly benefit from 
additional future market rate developments. The only actor that does not benefit 
from this arrangement were those that advocated for affordable housing, as they 
had limited say in any decision making process.  
 Housing Legacy? 
In January of 2012, significant changes to the original proposed 2009 
Athletes Village plan were announced by Infrastructure Ontario (Infrastructure 
Ontario, 2012). In the initial plan, it was reported that approximately 2,100 housing 
units would be required to support the 10,000 athletes partaking in the Games 
which would later be converted to affordable and market housing. However, 
Infrastructure Ontario realized that the cost of building the Athletes Village would 
exceed the initial projected estimations. In an effort to reduce costs, Infrastructure 
Ontario opted to reduce the total number of units to be contrasted for the Pan Am 
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Games. From the original 2,100 units proposal, only 1,140 were constructed in time 
for the games. The difference identified in Table 2 (below) shows a change of 890 
market-housing units and 147 affordable rental units. The Province’s decision to 
reduce the amount of affordable housing was triggered by the need to financially 
reduce the overrun costs to construct the Village “since the province will bear the 
cost of the subsidized units, Infrastructure Ontario recommended a reduction in 
affordable housing targets in the Village because it does not offer the Province 
added value for money” (Ali, 2012: 29). This decision significantly reduced the 
original construction of 400 affordable rental units to only 253 units, continuing a 
trend of mega-event host cities not fulfilling bidding promises associated with 
dedicated affordable housing. 
Table 2: Affordable Housing Outcomes 
 
Source:  Various planning documents and interviews by the author 
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Infrastructure Ontario was able to accommodate the 10,000 athletes with 
fewer units through design changes to the original plan. In an effort to reduce costs, 
Infrastructure Ontario put pressure on the development and design team to find a 
more compact and less costly way to accommodate the participating athletes 
(personal communication, 2015). Dundee Kilmer Development Limited was able to 
put more athletes into each unit by replacing the kitchen space of each unit with 
more beds. Even though Infrastructure Ontario was able to reduce the cost overruns 
of the project, the result translated into fewer overall numbers of available market 
and affordable housing units.  
4. Outcomes and Impacts of the Athletes Village Development 
Based on the above review of the Athletes Village development, lessons can be 
learned from the hosting experience. As the housing units of the Athletes Village 
have now transitioned into the market, the legacy of the event and Athletes Village 
will begin to be questioned. However, it is still too early to determine the overall 
negative or positive impacts of Athletes’ Village on social housing in Toronto.  
Still, the Pan Am Games exposed some realities and contradictions in 
securing affordable housing that may provide insight on future solutions for 
Toronto’s Waterfront. As well, the experience of the Athletes Village development 
may offer the momentum needed towards increased provisions and cooperation in 
the housing models to provide affordable housing.  
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Less than Expected  
While the Pan Am Games have proven to be successful in creating some new 
affordable housing units, the final number of units was significantly less than 
initially expected during the early bid and development stages of the Athletes 
Village. Since the details of the initial agreement with Dundee Kilmer Development 
Limited were extremely vague towards the affordable housing commitment, no firm 
number was ever agreed upon, which allowed for more flexibility and leverage for 
the developer to honor the agreement. The agreement with Dundee Kilmer 
Development Limited stated that they must develop 20 percent affordable housing 
in proportion to the overall build-out for the Games. However, because of the 
ambiguous language in the agreement, time and financial pressures, the developer 
was able to significantly reduce the final number of affordable housing units from 
the initial proposal (as seen in Table 2). Despite slashing more than one-third of the 
proposed units, all of the parties involved in delivering the Games continued to 
claim that the development of the Athletes Village honored the initial promised 
commitment.  
Uncertain Housing Outcomes 
During the development of the 2005 West Don Lands Precinct Plan, there 
was a tremendous amount of public consultation; this process was to ensure that 
the plan reflected the desires and values of the existing community. During this time 
the West Don Lands Committee played a large role as a key public stakeholder. 
Thus, when the West Don Lands were selected as the location to house the Athletes 
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Village, there was concern that the development of the Village would deviate from 
the previously developed precinct plan.  
As previously mentioned before, the delivery of the Athletes Village involved 
numerous actors, each with their own agendas and roles. While partnership 
agreements were necessary and an inevitable aspect of delivering such a large-scale 
event, it led to a situation wherein it was difficult to determine who was actually 
leading the delivery of the housing legacy. It was clear that the redevelopment was a 
shared vision among all the parties involved, but it was far less clear who, if anyone, 
took the role of lead advocate of housing legacies. Moving forward, without a 
champion monitoring and guiding the development of post-Games housing in the 
central waterfront, the affordable housing commitment quickly became at risk of 
representing only a vague aspiration.  
When Infrastructure Ontario was made the lead agency in charge of the 
Athletes Village, concerns arose considering that Infrastructure Ontario focused on 
the construction of buildings and not communities, which meant the agency lacked 
the sufficient experience to plan for a post games experience. As Table 1 and Table 3 
indicate, each agency had different primary goals. Infrastructure Ontario’s primary 
goal is to maximize a return on their investment, which suggests that the leading 
agency tasked with leading the redevelopment did not make affordable housing a 
primary goal. This is why the involvement of The West Don Lands Committee was 
important to monitor the scenario, ensuring that commitments were maintained 
and followed through.  
49 
 
The West Don Lands Committee acted as a watchdog to ensure that key 
principles and the integrity of the precinct plan were maintained. Regular meetings 
were held between 2009 to 2012 by Waterfront Toronto and Infrastructure Ontario 
with the West Don Lands Committee and local residents to provide updates on the 
Village development.  Despite these meetings, it was not until the design renderings 
were released in 2012 did the Committee find out about the reduction in market and 
affordable housing produced in the Athletes Village (Ali, 2012). This meant that the 
residents were kept out of the discussion when the decision was made to reduce the 
number of total housing units. Having an open and transparent dialog with the 
public is key to ensuring that any planning or development is truly a reflection of 
good planning principles and an inclusive public process. The under-estimation of 
the development costs for the Village ultimately led to the reduction in total units. 
However, the fact that information was deliberately withheld from the public prior 
to finalizing site renderings suggests that key decisions for the development of the 
Athletes Village were made on business cases and not made in the public’s best 
interests. Even though the Committee played the “watch dog” role, they do not have 
any real power and could not prevent the reduction in the final count of affordable 
housing units. Thus, the affordable housing objectives of the Central Waterfront 
Secondary Plan remain in limbo until a major player commits to leading the delivery 
of affordable housing along the waterfront.  
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Table 3: Role in Providing Affordable Housing 
Source:  Various planning documents and interviews by the author 
Despite the reduction of promised affordable housing units, it should be 
acknowledged that 253 below-market and rent-geared-to-income homes were 
created through the Pan Am Games. This number signifies a good step forward in a 
long and challenging road ahead to address Toronto’s desperate need for affordable 
housing and final completion of the West Don Lands site. However, since the 
completion of the Pan Am Games, there has been little activity in regards to the next 
steps to fully develop the West Don Lands site (Webb, 2016). Members of the West 
Don Lands Committee expected Waterfront Toronto to initiate the next steps of 
planning, with hopes that the West Don Lands Committee would work 
collaboratively on outstanding issues such as location and format of the remaining 
affordable rental housing.  
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Recommendations  
Based on previous mega-event literature and Toronto’s 2015 Pan Am games 
experience, recommendations that could start addressing some of the marginalizing 
social issues of mega-events are:  
1) International Mega-Event Organizations need to find solutions to 
guarantee commitments for social benefits that are tied to their events. 
A social benefit trust fund could be created as a requirement of winning bids where 
a portion of funds be allocated and only used on projects directly related to the 
promised social benefits. International mega-event organizations would contribute 
a percentage towards the trust fund.  
2) Should Toronto obtain additional mega events, opportunities to invest 
into affordable housing must have set targets and outcomes. 
The ambiguity of the affordable housing component in the contract between 
Infrastructure Ontario and Dundee Kilmer allowed for flexibility to reduce the total 
number of affordable housing units, while meeting the affordable housing target of 
20%. In order to avoid vagueness and increase accountability, contract agreements 
have to have set unit targets and goals.  
3) Planning for the delivery of a mega-event must have complete 
representation and consensus in the decision making process. 
To ensure that the planning process of the mega-event is open and transparent, 
there must be full representation and consensus among all parties involved in 
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decision making. Decisions that affect the promised social benefits for the games 
should not be economically motivated. All stakeholders must have equal power to 
decide how a development may occur.  
4) Mega-events should be hosted in a policy environment that encourages 
affordable housing. 
The aggressive affordable housing policies of the Central Waterfront Secondary Plan 
and West Don Lands Precinct Plan provided housing advocates (albeit to a limited 
extent) with a louder voice at the table. This ensured that affordable housing for the 
Pan-Am Games were not reduced beyond the 20% target, which is consistent with 
the objectives of the two policy documents.  
5) The same momentum that is harnessed to acquire a mega-event should 
to be harnessed into the social needs of the public regardless.  
Pursing a mega-event should not provide the justification towards investing in the 
needs of people. The same amount of effort, preparation, and cooperation that go 
into acquiring resources, strategizing solutions, and aligning similar goals should be 
harnessed towards the creation of a healthy and vibrant city for all.  
Conclusion  
Now that the 2015 Pan Am Games are finished and the Athletes Village 
competed, what is the legacy of this mega-event? This is a question that will be 
analyzed for many years to come with no simple answer. But, before anyone can 
begin to answer the legacy question, I believe that the story of the experience must 
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be understood first. I hope that more can be learned from the affordable housing 
experience of the Games towards policies than the actual produced outcome. The 
development of the Athletes Village did produced affordable housing, but in less 
significant amount than initially planned. This paper intended to answer key 
questions: Why was the West Don Lands site chosen? Who were the stakeholders 
involved? How truly involved was the public is decision making? Why was the 
number of affordable housing units reduced? Who truly benefited from the Pan Am 
Games? Although the story of the 2015 Pan Am Games may have uniquely position 
Toronto to the international scene, the story of the Athletes Village is not new.  
Whether it takes place in Barcelona, Salt Lake City, Vancouver, or Toronto, there are 
similarities in each story that furthers discussion about injustice within mega-event 
discourse.  
By focusing on the story of the 2015 Pan Am Games, one can feel ambivalent 
towards the mega-event. This is because as the Games are awarded, one can only 
hope that the momentous amounts of money will truly deliver for the host city and 
benefit the public. However, knowing that without radical reform, host cities of 
major sporting events will continue to have similar stories where the most 
disadvantaged in our societies are marginalized at the hands of urban and economic 
growth for the very few. These struggles are seen time and time again, most 
noticeably in larger events such as the World Cups and Olympics, with the most 
recent 2016 Rio Olympic Games possibly representing the most socially damaging 
games in an already unequal and divided city, and being dubbed the “Exclusion 
Games’ (Sriskandarajah, 2016).  
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This mega-event tragedy derives initially from the selection process of the 
games. International sports organizations like the IOC, or FIFA, currently wield 
absolute power. Vast amount of money flow through these organizations and they 
have tremendous financial influence the highest level of politics. Every mega-event 
has similar stories about wealthy business and political elites benefiting from 
development or new laws being introduced for the event to prevent political 
protest, essentially legitimizing state violence and eroding civil liberties 
(Sriskandarajah, 2016). It is only until the interests of the public are put at the heart 
of the selection process and only when a voice is given to the people will the 
corruption and the unequal distribution of benefits hopefully begin to fade. With 
public pressure continuing to mount for institutional change towards the selection 
process, the IOCs and FIFAs of the world have at least agreed to review the host city 
selection process. One can only be hesitant to think much change will truly occur. If 
true change is to occur, host city bids must include clear obligations relating to 
human rights and guaranteed public benefits, with strategies to reduce local 
community impacts towards issues like displacement. Most importantly, mega-
events should not be seen as a panacea for all urban issues, but with more of an 
open and transparent decision making process, it should at the very least not 
exacerbate them.  
The message of the anti-Olympic Games bid in Toronto in 2008 was ‘Bread 
not Circuses’, the slogan was intended to highlight the true legacy benefits or lack 
thereof the games (Srishandarajah, 2016). This message represented a fight towards 
representation and increase equity. When Toronto won the rights to host the 2015 
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Pan Am Games, this message was initially infused within the key social benefits and 
largely within the final plan for the Athletes Village. But somewhere down the road, 
the message lost traction and Toronto eventually missed an opportunity to set an 
example for the entire world to see. Governmental stakeholders were not 
committed to delivering on their promises, the public’s voice was left out of key 
decisions, and the development consortium was the main beneficiary. Again, this is 
the same old story seen countless times. As such, the focus of the Athletes Village 
development was towards a forceful strategy to facilitate waterfront development, 
representing a way to align the interests of growth coalitions with the political 
agenda of the city, and not the true interests of the people (Andranovich et al., 
2001).   
Now I may be naïve to think that something good will come from this 
experience, but I think it may. The experience of the Athletes Village has generated a 
fair amount of discussion on affordable housing among housing advocates of 
Toronto’s continuous and dire need to supply it. For years municipalities all across 
Ontario have been advocating for new strategies towards supplying affordable 
housing from higher levels of government. Only until recently has there been 
significant progress made in the affordable housing discussion that has not been 
seen for quite some time. To highlight a few, with their current powers, the City of 
Toronto has taken the initiative to promote the “Open Doors” program to encourage 
a business case for development that includes affordable housing (Toronto, 2015). 
The provincial government has also introduced the ‘Promoting Affordable Housing 
Act’ which intends permit municipalities to create inclusionary housing zones, areas 
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in which all new development would be required to include a percentage towards 
affordable housing (Gallant, 2016). Finally, the federal government has announced 
that it is working towards a national housing strategy set to be in place by the end of 
the year (Stueck, 2016). Although these significant steps are not directly related to 
the story of the Athletes Village, I do believe that there is an emerging connection.  
The 2015 Pan Am Games experience may have profiled the affordable 
housing discussion; however, it was the reduction of the produced affordable units 
in the Athletes Village that exposed the real challenges that need to be addressed. 
These challenges are the pro-growth coalitions, the tightening austerity measures, 
and the limited voice of the public. I can only hope that the Athletes Village 
experience fuels a progressive fight for change. Maybe the true legacy of the Pan Am 
Games will not be the affordable housing that was produced, but perhaps when 
looking back in history, the true legacy of the 2015 Pan Am Games will be identified 
as a critical moment that contributed towards a reform of housing policies, finally 
aiding in the social benefits that was once promised.   
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